Countries in Russian and U.S. spheres of influence

increasingly chafe under disintegrating yokes

MOSCOW (Kommersant) — The end last week of US President George Bush's tour of South America was marked by gleeful reporting in the Russian press of the anti-American demonstrations that dogged Mr. Bush's footsteps throughout his trip and the false notes struck by America's policy in relation to its southern neighbor. In truth, however, the relationship between the US and Latin America is remarkably reminiscent of the relationship between Russia and the CIS.

It is the commonly accepted wisdom that Latin America was first declared a sphere of interest of the United States by the Monroe Doctrine, which was formulated by US President James Monroe in an address to Congress in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine laid out three basic principles of American foreign policy: noninterference by American nations in European affairs, noninterference by European nations in American affairs, and the determination to hinder any attempts by European countries to compromise the independence of any American nation via colonization. "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," said President Monroe in his address. In short, the United States took upon itself responsibility for both American continents and, having proclaimed that Europe should not meddle in American affairs, actively undertook to do some meddling itself in the political life of Latin America.

Russia's claims to influence over the former Soviet republics are already eroding, despite their relatively recent history as member states of a single nation, the USSR. Soon after the fall of the USSR the former republics, with the exception of the three Baltic states, joined together to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Russian elite, however, has clearly never been wholly satisfied with the current situation and continues to feel nostalgia for the old Soviet Union. "It is my deep conviction that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a colossal geopolitical tragedy," said Vladimir Putin when he was still only a candidate for Russian president. Under the Soviet Union, he explained, "cultural, linguistic, and inter-religious problems could be resolved on a new basis within the framework of a unified nation." It is, of course, no accident that Mr. Putin's first official trips abroad as the president of Russia were to the countries of the CIS. In Russia, the desire shared by George, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan to join NATO is seen as a direct threat to national security. Moreover, Moscow is doing everything in its power to purge the Central Asian republics of American military bases: in 2005, for example, Uzbekistan yielded to pressure from Russia and kicked American soldiers out of the Khanabad airbase, and one of the most important issues in Russian-Kyrgyz relations remains the closing of an American military base at Bishkek's Manas airport.

Both the United States and Russia are ready to go to whatever lengths necessary to keep their neighbors within their respective spheres of influence. The US has interfered several times in political struggles in the countries of Latin American, and Washington has repeatedly supported, either openly or covertly, military coups on the South American continent, such as the toppling of Chilean President Salvadore Allende in 1973 and of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega in 1980 and the temporary overthrow of democratically-elected Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. The closest analogies in the CIS are probably the successful operations by the Russian armed forces to install pro-Russian regimes in the breakaway republics of Transdneistr and South Ossetia.

Several attempts by the United States to overthrow South American regimes have gone awry: it is sufficient to remember the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba in 1962 or American support for the coup staged by Venezuelan industrialists in 2004, in which President Hugo Chavez was removed from power for all of two days. At the top of Russia's list could be last summer's accusations from Georgia that its northern neighbor is sponsoring an opposition movement that has tried to overthrow the Georgian government.

But interference by force is far from being the only means by which the US and Russia attempt to retain to their influence. For example, Washington's attempts to influence the outcome of elections in Latin American countries are common knowledge, although the southern tide has definitely turned: while pro-American candidates used to have elections fairly well sewn up, anti-Americans such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are now running away with victory. Russia is encountering the same problem. Over the last few years, the so-called Color Revolutions have brought some inconvenient leaders to power in Russia's neighbors, and Moscow's attempts to influence parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2003 and in Moldova in 2005, as well as the Ukrainian presidential campaign in 2004, have all met with failure.

The scene in 2004 on Kiev's central square was replicated last year in downtown Mexico City during the presidential campaign between the "Mexican Yanukovych" Felipe Calderon, considered the official successor of the outgoing president and a loyal supporter of Mexico's powerful neighbor to the north, and the populist opposition leader Andreas Manuel Lopez Obrador, a zealous opponent of America's influence. According to official statistics, the two candidates received approximately equal numbers of votes, with a tiny advantage for Calderon. When the results were reported, the opposition took to the streets in the center of the Mexican capital, vowing to stay until Lopez Obrador emerged victorious. But unlike the Ukrainian protestors, the Mexican demonstrators received no outside support, and Felipe Calderon was eventually declared president.

Russia and the United States both actively employ economic weapons to exert pressure on disloyal regimes. In 2006, Russia banned the import first of Moldovan and then Georgian wine and mineral water when the political courses charted by Chisinau and Tbilisi failed to find favor with Moscow. Russia has also resorted to using energy as a weapon: in 2005, gas prices unexpectedly rose sharply for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and, at the beginning of 2007, for Azerbaijan and Belarus as well. For its part, the US indulges in economic leverage in Latin America equally often. The most obvious example of Washington's long arm, of course, is the decades-long economic and trade embargo against Cuba. In addition, sanctions affecting trade and transportation of goods were imposed on Nicaragua in 1985 during Washington's campaign against the extreme-leftist Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front, who overthrew the pro-American dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979.

The degree of freedom enjoyed by the countries of Latin America from the US, or by the countries of the CIS from Russia, varies widely. Nations in each of the "protectorate" regions can be easily broken down into several distinct groups depending on their relationship to their "patron." The most obedient, of course, are the less well-off countries, particularly those that have recently survived domestic armed conflicts, such as Colombia and Tajikistan. Economic development, on the other hand, tends to encourage countries to adopt fairly pragmatic politics: they try to be independent insofar as independence is possible, but they also try to avoid quarrelling with their larger neighbor. Good examples of this include Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Finally, each region must have a pariah, the country with the worst relationship with the big dog next door. This country is small and weak and, due to years of sanctions, is getting by on help from abroad and the resilience of its people: for Latin America and the CIS these countries are, of course, Cuba and Georgia.

In addition, both the American and Russian authorities must cope with the large numbers of migrants flowing across their borders from their "protectorates." American and Russian citizens often complain that the new arrivals do not want to embrace the dominant culture, do not learn the language, cluster in ghettos, steal jobs, and breed crime. Thus, over the last year both countries have passed laws aimed at stemming the flow of migrants from Latin America and the CIS, respectively. In the US last year, the House of Representatives approved harsh legislation that would have made it a crime to enter the United States without appropriate documentation. The legislation also included the construction of a 1120-km-long fence along the Mexican border. Also last year, Russia adopted a government measure to restrict the fraction of foreign workers in the country's retail sector. According to the new law, they are to be banished completely from kiosks and market stalls by April of this year.

It is so far impossible to tell whether Russia has the same kind of reputation in the CIS as the US has in Latin America, a region that has traditionally been notable for its anti-Americanism. In the former Soviet republics, many still recall the cozy closeness of Soviet times with a certain fondness, but enmity towards Russia is beginning to appear. In Belarus, for example, a spark of anti-Russian sentiment flared up last winter, leading to January's gas war between Moscow and Minsk – and this from the country that until recently was reputed to have the most pro-Russian population in the CIS. According to recent polls, anti-Russian feeling is also growing in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.

Their low popularity notwithstanding, Russia and the US remain important labor markets for their "little brothers." Mexicans and Central Americans, despite popular anti-Americanism, flock over the border to the United States, as do their counterparts in the former Soviet republics, who head for Russia not only to work but to send their children to school there. One important difference between the CIS states and Latin America, however, is that geography gives Latin Americans little choice in the matter: they have no access to better places to work than the United States. The Ukrainians, Moldovans, Belarussians, and natives of the Caucasus, on the other hand, are increasingly looking past Russia to Europe, where they enjoy more social guarantees and where they are more welcome than Arabs and Africans.

— By Nargiz Asadova and Mikhail Zygar

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